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1. Introduction
Research on the European Parliament (EP) as a legisla-
tive arena shows that there is not only a high degree
of policy coherence and cohesive voting behavior within
European Political Groups (EPGs) but also clear differ-
entiation and competition between EPGs on key policy
issues (e.g., Hix, Kreppel, & Noury, 2003; Lefkofridi &
Katsanidou, 2018; McElroy & Benoit, 2010; but see also
Cicchi, 2011). However, transnational policy differentia-
tion between alliances in the European parliamentary
arena has consistently failed so far to translate to ‘trans-
late’ in the European electoral arena.
Contestation over transnational policies in the EP
electoral arena would increase European Union (EU) pol-
icy responsiveness to the (changing) preferences of EU cit-
izens, thus benefiting European democracy (Follesdal &
Hix, 2006). Although the EPG systemhas long since grown
strong and “ready for power” (Hix et al., 2003), it has not
transformed into a transnational party system that offers
EU voters alternative European policy options to choose
from. Seeking to address this deficit, the EP made use of
a new Treaty article (EU, 2007, Article 17[7]) that links
the Head of the Commission to the results of European
elections and came up with the Spitzenkandidaten ex-
periment in 2014 (see Hobolt, 2014), a system which it
preserved up until the 2019 election. Note that this oc-
curred after significant EP empowerment (e.g., the ex-
pansion of policy areas subject to co-decision; EU, 2007)
and at a time of high levels of politicization of European
integration. As recent empirical research has convinc-
ingly shown, however, the experiment had limited suc-
cess (Braun & Popa, 2018; Braun & Schwarzbözl, 2019).
A persistent deficit of EP elections continues to be the
absence of competition among alternative transnational
policies. While EU issues play an increasing role in the
European electoral arena, this arena remains dominated
by national issues or EU polity issues that are not subject
to the EP’s jurisdiction (Braun, Hutter, & Kerscher, 2016;
Lefkofridi & Kritzinger, 2008; Novelli & Johansson, 2019).
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Why does the European election fail to produce com-
petition between European policy alternatives even in
spite of the increased politicization of European integra-
tion and efforts to connect its results to the Commission
Presidency via the Spitzenkandidaten? In this article
I present a model of the actual choice likely to be offered
by vote-, office-, and policy-seeking parties under the
specific conditions of competition in the European arena.
This model synthesizes insights from Strøm’s (1990) be-
havioral theory of competitive parties (votes, office, pol-
icy) and Bartolini’s (1999, 2000) four dimensions of elec-
toral competition (contestability, availability, decidabil-
ity, and incumbent vulnerability). Using this model of the
European arena as a political-electoral ‘market,’ I high-
light major obstacles to EU policy responsiveness that
relate to the supply and demand of transnational pol-
icy competition.
Debates about the EP election’s connection to EU-
level executive office through Spitzenkandidaten often
overlook the barriers to enter this competition in the first
place. Although such barriers to entry may be variably
low for national-level newcomers and outsiders, they
are universally high for transnational ones (low EU-level
contestability). As such, these barriers encourage nation-
alist vote- and policy-seeking strategies as opposed to
transnationalist strategies. In spite of a growing transna-
tional cleavage (Hooghe & Marks, 2018) and large num-
bers of potentially ‘available’ voters (who might be will-
ing to switch fromnational to supranational policy suppli-
ers), these voters remain trapped in segmented electoral
markets (low EU-level availability). As it stands, there-
fore, the European arena discourages the transnational
expression of support for or opposition to EU policies on
both the supply and demand sides of competition. By in-
hibiting competition over transnational (as opposed to
national) policy alternatives (EU-level decidability), this
arena traps European citizens and elites in a futile de-
bate in favor of or against the EU as a whole. Crucially,
as long as the debate is structured not in EU policy
but in EU polity terms (pro/anti-EU), nationalists have
an advantage because their basic ideology (nationalism
versus Europeanism) structures the competition. This
means that where there is a growing transnational cleav-
age (Hooghe & Marks, 2018), then the transnational
part of that cleavage is disenfranchised by the way in
which EP elections are conducted. Under current condi-
tions, the connection of the EP results to the Commission
Presidency is unlikely to produce the desired results in
terms of transnational expression of support for or op-
position to EU policies (EU policy differentiation). Unless
structural change is pursued, therefore, the very rules of
the EP game will continue to help nationalists gain.
2. Party Goals and Conditions of Competition
I assume that parties are purposeful actors pursuing
votes, policy, and office (Strøm, 1990). Parties aim at
increased electoral shares, enhanced advocacy of their
ideologies, and the attainment of executive power in
the form of politically discretionary governmental and
sub-governmental appointments (Bartolini, 1999, 2000;
Pedersen, 2012; Strøm, 1990). While vote-seeking ad-
dresses the electorate at large (public opinion), policy-
seeking is a goal closely linked to parties’ ideologies and
their partisans (de Sio & Weber, 2014; Lefkofridi & Nezi,
2019) aimed at strengthening advocacy for ideologies
supported by core segments of the electorate who iden-
tify with a specific party instead of others.
The feasibility of each goal is conditioned by insti-
tutional opportunities and constraints, which further
shape the trade-offs that parties face between these
goals (Müller & Strøm, 1999, pp. 5–13). A strategy of opti-
mizing votes, for example, may render a party unaccept-
able as a cabinet coalition partner by other parties on
policy grounds, while to achieve office a party may sacri-
fice policy or “soft-pedal” issues and policy promises that
could maximize its votes (Bartolini, 2000, p. 44).
2.1. EP Empowerment, Politicization, and Contestation
over EU Policies
Party contestation over EU policies in the EP arena was
expected to benefit from the politicization of European
integration, the EP’s empowerment, and the connec-
tion of the European election’s outcome with the
Commission Presidency (Bardi et al., 2010; Follesdal &
Hix, 2006; Hix, 2002, 2013). The Lisbon Treaty (EU, 2007)
established the EP as a co-legislator on an equal foot-
ing with the Council and linked EP election results to the
Commission Presidency. As a result, in 2014 and 2019
some EU-level parties appointed lead candidates for the
post of Commission President. The Spitzenkandidaten
system operated during a decade of unprecedented lev-
els of politicization of the EU and its policies, generated
by multiple crises (the economic and financial crisis, the
migration crisis, and Brexit). Taken together, these devel-
opments should have generated “greater incentives for
stronger party organizations and greater possibilities for
parties to shape EU policy outcomes in a particular ide-
ological direction” (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005, p. 211).
Politicization should have strengthened vote-seekers’ in-
centives to invest in EU issues for electoral gains; the
strengthening of the EP should have enhanced policy-
seekers’ interest in EU-level advocacy of their ideology;
and the Spitzenkandidaten experiment should havemoti-
vated office-seekers to engage in a transnational contest
over the Presidency.
In the most recent (2019) election, the key dividing
line was (still) less about different visions of the Union
and accompanying policy proposals to implement these
visions than about whether we want the Union or not.
Turnout increased for the first time, however, and EU vot-
ers broke the historical pattern of electing a combined
majority held by two major mainstream pro-EU party
families (i.e., Christian and Social Democrats). The win-
ners of this election were either clearly pro-integration
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parties, such as the Greens and the Liberals, or the most
obviously anti-integration forces, such as the far-right
Identity and Democracy group. One winning group sees
the EU as an opportunity for their prime policy goals
(environmentalism, liberalism), while the other sees it
as a major obstacle to their goals (nationalism). While
this result constitutes evidence of a rising transnational
cleavage (Hooghe & Marks, 2018), as long as the debate
is structured not in policy but in polity terms (pro/anti-
EU dimension), nationalists will continue to have an ad-
vantage because their basic ideology (nationalism versus
Europeanism) structures the competition. Below I will ar-
gue that the specific conditions of competition in the EU
arena encourage nationalist vote—and policy-seeking
strategies while hampering transnationalist vote- and
policy-seeking strategies.
Competition is understood here as the process
through which parties try to shape (to their advantage)
the structure of electoral preferences (Bartolini, 1999,
2000). To understand how and which types of goal-
oriented behavior would result in more or less EU pol-
icy differentiation, we first need to specify how different
conditions of competition incentivize vote-, policy- and
office-seeking parties to differentiate (or obfuscate) the
EU policy offer. For this purpose, I review the general
conditions under which parties compete and present a
model of decidability (policy differentiation).
2.2. Conditions of Competition
Bartolini’s (1999, 2000) framework identifies four empir-
ical dimensions of politico-electoral competition:
• Contestability: The rules of the game that struc-
ture political opportunities for old and new contes-
tants (Bartolini, 1999, p. 460), including legal eligi-
bility requirements to stand for and vote in an elec-
tion and thresholds for seat distribution;
• Availability: The quota of available voters who are
“willing to consider changing their party choice,”
or the potential for electoral volatility (Bartolini,
1999, p. 465);
• Decidability: The level of actual choice available to
voters (Bartolini, 2000, pp. 34–51);
• Incumbent vulnerability: The likelihood of incum-
bents being replaced as a result of changes in vot-
ers’ choices (Bartolini, 2000, pp. 52–55).
Given the interconnectedness of these four dimensions,
any empirical theory of competitionmust link one dimen-
sion with another by highlighting what “consequences
each entails for the other” (Bartolini, 2000, p. 61). Since
responsiveness is a key concern in the debate about
EU-level contestation, here I will focus on decidabil-
ity, which, along with incumbent vulnerability, consti-
tutes a necessary condition for responsiveness. While
the vulnerability of incumbents is a necessary condi-
tion for decidability, however, it is not sufficient of itself
(Bartolini, 2000).
In Bartolini’s (2000) model, decidability is assumed
to be dependent not only upon incumbent vulnerabil-
ity but also upon contestability and availability (Table 1).
Differentiation in the policy offer between parties is ex-
pected under the following conditions: First, when bar-
riers to newcomers in the political market are low (high
contestability ↑); second, when a considerable part of
the electorate is willing to switch along the key dividing
lines (high availability ↑); third, when voters are able
to reward or sanction incumbents (high vulnerability ↑).
Table 1 summarizes this proposition and visualizes the re-
lationships involved.
3. Contestability, Availability, and Incumbent
Vulnerability in the European Arena
Applying this model we would expect EU decidability
(which concerns levels of differentiation and clarity in
the EU positions offered by parties) to be generated by
low barriers to transnational policy supply and demand,
tougher with high EU-wide availability of voters willing
to switch between EU-level parties, and high capacity of
the EU-wide electorate to sanction EU-level incumbents.
Given that such conditions would serve to incentivize
transnationalist vote-, policy- and office-seeking, the first
question that must be addressed is whether such condi-
tions exist.
Until now, the political and scholarly debates have
concentrated on strengthening the electoral connec-
tion to an EU-level office (incumbent vulnerability) as
a means of incentivizing office-seeking parties to en-
gage in an arena which (for them) is regarded as a
“beauty contest” (van der Brug, van der Eijk, & Franklin,
2007). However, the strong focus of this debate on office-
seeking parties and their lack of engagement overlooks
the fact that incumbent vulnerability alone is not a suffi-
cient condition for decidability. In the following, I place
Table 1. Supply and demand conditions of political competition (Bartolini, 1999, 2000).
SUPPLY
DEMAND Availability Decidability
(voters willing to switch) (party differences)
Contestability
↑
↑ → ↑(high when barriers to enter are low)
Incumbent Vulnerability
↑
↑ → ↑(high when executive tenure is not safe)
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a strong focus on the barriers to entry, which helps in as-
sessing the degree to which transnationalist/nationalist
vote- and policy-seeking strategies are encouraged or dis-
couraged. By combining this dimension with the vulner-
ability and availability dimensions we can assess the con-
sequences for EU-level policy differentiation in a more
comprehensive manner.
3.1. Contestability
The 1976 Direct Election Act establishes some common
basic principles, but national laws regulating contestabil-
ity in the EP arena differ. Since 2002, all members use
some form of proportional representation with varied
list systems that provide different incentives to create
a strong connection between deputies and electorates
(Hix & Hagemann, 2009). For countries using dispropor-
tional rules in domestic elections (e.g., France, Greece,
and the UK), the European election grants easier access
to willing competitors. Precisely because the EP election
does not lead to government formation and is conducted
using proportional electoral rules, (small) parties lacking
“governing potential” (Sartori, 1976) at national level are
likely to seek those votes that they would not receive
in national elections, especially in systems where ballots
cast for third-parties are “wasted” (Mueller, 2003).
That being said, the threshold for seat allocation
used across the EU varies, ranging from 0% to 5%. Many
EU member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, and the UK) employ no threshold at
all. Cyprus and Greece set the threshold at 1.8% and
3% respectively, while Austria, Italy and Sweden em-
ploy a 4% threshold. In nine EU member states (Croatia,
the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), competitors face the
highest threshold of 5% (EP, 2019).Where thresholds are
low, vote- and policy-seeking incentives are stronger for
small existing parties, as well as for new competitors for
whom the EP arena may serve as a ‘back door’ for enter-
ing their national electoral arenas (e.g., Alternative für
Deutschland). Even stronger incentives to seek votes in
the EP arena are provided in countries where parties be-
come eligible for public funding once they have received
a specific number of votes in the EP election, includ-
ing Greece, Germany, and Portugal (see van Klingeren,
Orozco, van Spanje, & de Vreese, 2015).
There is also variation in the right to stand for elec-
tion in the European arena. Besides national differences
in the minimum age required for candidacy, candida-
cies are restricted to EU citizens who are nationals of x
member state or residents of x member state that sat-
isfy the same requirements that each member sets for
its own nationals (EP, 2019, Article 10, Council Directive
93/109/EC). To stand as a candidate in Luxembourg, for
instance, where the foreign population exceeds 20% of
the electorate, a residence period of five years is re-
quired. Such residence requirements disadvantage mo-
bile EU citizens who move frequently between member
states for work purposes. While nominations may only
be submitted by political parties and political organiza-
tions in some EU member states, in other states nomi-
nations may be endorsed by a required number of signa-
tures, ranging from 5,000 in Belgium to 150,000 in Italy
(Alemanno, 2018; EP, 2019). Candidate nomination and
selection procedures, in turn, impact the kind of activi-
ties in which deputies engage once elected (Euchner &
Frech, 2020).
Last but not least, no person may stand as a can-
didate in more than one EU country in the same elec-
tion (Article 4, Council of the EU, 1993). This last pro-
vision closes the market to candidates with an ambi-
tion to mobilize voters in more than one member state,
which would necessitate a transnational policy platform.
To address this deficit, Andrew Duff, a Member of the EP
(MEP), developed a proposal for transnationalizing elec-
toral lists—an idea that was discussed in light of Brexit
(see Verger, 2018). This proposal for the first “really pan-
European” constituencywas rejected in the EP’s final ple-
nary vote in February 2018 (VoteWatch EU, 2018). The
failure of the proposal was due not only to Eurosceptics
but also to the members of the European People’s Party
(EPP) that currently dominates EU institutions.
The rules of the EP game as they currently stand
provide a relatively open politico-electoral market to
national-level competitors in most (but not all) member
states. Wherever and insofar as the EP lowers the bar-
riers to enter the competition, the EP arena is likely to
be highly valued and utilized by outsiders/newcomers
and small existing competitors to increase their electoral
strength and/or reinforce their policy influence in the EP.
Provided that national parties can find congruent coun-
terparts and formEPGs, they can use the European arena
for forming common policy fronts against their competi-
tors. Green parties did exactly this andmanaged to bring
about policy changes to their national systems via suc-
cessful coordination at EU level (Bomberg, 2002).
That said, the EP arena sets high barriers to the entry
of new transnational competitors such as, for example,
the pan-Europeanmovements Diem25 and Volt. Fielding
candidates in 28 different member states with different
national provisions complicates the strategies of transna-
tionalmovementswilling to engage in the arena. In some
member states the 5% threshold may be too high to
overcome for new transnational organizations compet-
ing against national parties that are organizationally en-
trenched in domestic systems. Volt ran candidates in
eight different countries and won only one seat, for ex-
ample, while Diem25 fielded candidates in eleven coun-
tries but failed to gain any seats at all, even in Greece
where one of its (famous) founders, Yanis Varoufakis,
won 2.99% of the vote. This is because EU-level contesta-
bility of the EP arena is very low (high barriers), which un-
dermines the vote- and policy-seeking efforts of transna-
tional political entrepreneurs seeking to diversify the EU
policy offer.
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Barriers to entry also concern the right to vote, hence
it is worth highlighting that voting methods vary for
EU citizens resident abroad (Sabbati, Sgueo, & Dobreva,
2019; see also SpaceEU, 2019). On the basis of the free
movement of labor, EU citizens can seek jobs in differ-
ent member states, which results in increasing mobility
within the EU territory. In 2017, about 17 million (4%
of the EU’s working population) were living in a coun-
try other than their member state of origin, while an
additional 1.4 million constituted cross-border workers
(European Commission, 2018). Mobile EU citizens are
confronted with complex procedures and varied dead-
lines for electoral registration in their countries of resi-
dence or of origin, often needing to travel to distant cities
if no voting booth is provided where they live. These EU
citizens are the most likely to have preferences for or
against specific transnational policies, but the European
arena makes exercising their democratic right particu-
larly cumbersome. This implies that those “who are in ef-
fect building Europe from the bottomup, alongwith their
lives and families” face more difficulties in steering its
political future (Alemanno, 2019). Setting high barriers
to voters who are likely to have preferences for specific
EU policies thus weakens the incentives for vote-seeking
parties to address these preferences.
3.2. Availability
The organizational encapsulation of voters has been in
decline in Western Europe, while it has never been
very strong in Central-Eastern Europe (Rohrschneider &
Whitefield, 2012; van Biezen,Mair, & Poguntke, 2012). In
the EU as a whole there is a high availability of voters,
which ismanifested through low voters’ scores of various
indicators such as party identification and partymember-
ship, and higher electoral volatility (e.g., Kriesi & Pappas,
2015, p. 2). To date, these large amounts of available
voters across the Union remain “encapsulated territori-
ally.” The fact that voters can only choose between those
parties operating within the borders of a single member
state (either the EU member state of their origin or of
their residence) does not encourage the articulation of
transnational policy alternatives by vote-seeking parties.
On the demand side the market is segmented,
while the partisan connection between citizens and
EU-level parties remains weak. This is due, amongst
other factors, to the attitudes of Europarties’ own na-
tional member parties towards individual membership,
since strengthening European citizens’ individual mem-
bership of Europarties would compete directly with na-
tional parties over their own (existing or potential) party
members (Hertner, 2019). This holds true also for the
Greens, despite being the most Europeanized party fam-
ily (Bomberg, 2002). This effort by policy-seeking or-
ganizations to retain control over their partisans also
impedes the transnational expression of preferences
for/against EU policies.
3.3. Incumbent Vulnerability
The European arena is not bound to the alternation of ex-
ecutive power at EU level, which means safety of tenure.
EU-level institutions cannot be (collectively) sanctioned
for the policies they pursue, which disincentivizes office-
seeking parties from EU-level differentiation. The miss-
ing connection between the EP arena and some kind of
‘EU-level government’ implies weak incentives for office-
seeking parties to engage in this arena, and this has been
regarded as the key obstacle towards the development
of a transnational party system, the strengthening of
transnational parties and, ultimately, contestation over
EU policies in European elections (Bardi et al., 2010, p. 7;
Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Hix, 2002).
The specific conditions of competition in the EP arena
are summarized in Table 2.
4. Parties’ Goals and the Consequences for Decidability
in the European Area
Approaching the European arena from the perspective
of party goals under these specific conditions (as sum-
marized in Table 2) generates three key insights. First,
the multilevel structure separates party goals from one
another, since the successful pursuit of each goal con-
cerns different levels of aggregation in the same chan-
nel (national vs. EU-levels of EP representation) or even
Table 2. Conditions of competition in the EP arena.
SUPPLY ‘Protected’
DEMAND ‘Segmented’ Availability Decidability
Territorially encapsulated; high National-level and EU-level
barriers to transnational citizens differentiation
Contestability
NAT ↑
EU↓
NAT ↑
EU↓ → NAT ↑EU↓Open to national competitorsClosed to transnational competitors
Incumbent vulnerability
NAT ↓
EU↓
NAT ↑
EU↓ → NAT ↓EU↓‘Safety of Tenure—Inability to Sanction’Arena very weakly connected to EU institutions’
executive power.
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different institutions (national government, EU Council,
Commission); hence strategies to optimize votes or pol-
icy have no direct repercussions for office-seeking, which
is served by another arena. Moreover, although a con-
flict between vote- and policy-optimization is possible
(a strategy optimizing votes may alienate EPG partners),
EPGs’ strength in the assembly (seats), and consequently
their potential for policy influence, strongly depends
upon the success of EPG members’ national level vote-
seeking strategies.
Second, the European arena serves some party goals
(votes, policy) but not all (office). Among those party
goals that are feasible in the EP arena, vote-seeking
appears easier than policy-seeking. Successful policy-
seeking requires both mobilizing partisans and joining a
congruent EPG after the election. Hence, although the
European arena provides an important opportunity for
policy-seeking, it requires some effort (see also Pittoors,
2020). At the same time, transnationalist vote-seeking is
discouraged through barriers to entry and the territorial
encapsulation of (potentially available) voters.
Third, under the current conditions of competition in
the EP arena (closure of the supply market to transna-
tional supplies, territorial encapsulation of demand, and
safety of EU-level executive tenure), party goals incen-
tivize parties to structure competition in different ways,
with consequences for EU-level policy differentiation
(summarized in Table 3).
Since ideology matters for party positions on spe-
cific EU policies (Hooghe, Marks, &Wilson, 2002), policy-
seekers should by definition be more likely to struc-
ture contestation on EU policy issues and thus enhance
EU-level policy differentiation. And while parties, once
elected, make policy for all Europeans (not just their
domestic voters), they compete for the electoral sup-
port of domestic voters only. In this competition, policy-
seekers must compete successfully against vote- and
office-seeking parties (who employ different strategies,
see below) in an arena with low levels of EU-level con-
testability. Even the most fervent transnational policy-
seekers must first win the support of enough domestic
voters to pass the threshold if they want to succeed in
their EU level policy pursuit. In a market of territorially
segmented voters, policy-seeking parties have little to
gain electorally by structuring competition along the na-
tional versus transnational dividing line (Table 3).
Under the same conditions, office-seeking consider-
ations motivate parties to structure competition along
the government/opposition dimension (government dis-
approval) and to utilize the European election as a
popularity test of the domestic government’s perfor-
mance (Table 3). By structuring competition along the
incumbent-opposition dimension, the EP “beauty con-
test” (van der Brug et al., 2007) provides office-seekers
with valuable information about ‘available’ voters’ pref-
erences and behavior that they can use as a basis for de-
Table 3. Dimensions of competition and party goals.
Dimensions of Electoral Competition in the European Arena
Contestability Availability Vulnerability Decidability
Pa
rty
Go
als
Votes Potential for electoral
gains for newcomers
and insiders at the
margins
Potential for electoral
gains from shifts along
the mainstream vs.
anti-establishment
dividing line
Sanction/reward
mainstream parties
(and the EU as their
creation)
Level of differentiation
focuses on (domestic)
public opinion; clear
positions on EU polity;
inconsistent/blurred
positions on EU
policies
Office No potential for
executive office gains
(Weak connection to
Commission
Presidency)
Potential for
informational gains
from shifts along the
incumbent/opposition
dividing line
Sanction/reward
governments
Level of differentiation
focuses on
government
performance:
(dis-)approval of
national government;
blurred positions on
EU polity and EU
policies
Policy Potential for policy
advocacy gains
through cooperation in
the EP
(Weak) Potential for
electoral gains from
shifts along the
national versus
transnational dividing
line
Sanction/reward EU
policy
Level of differentiation
focuses on party
ideology; clear
positions on EU polity
and EU policies
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vising strategies to gain office at the next national elec-
tion. At the same time, vote-seekers are motivated to
structure competition along the insiders vs. outsiders
(mainstream vs. anti-establishment) conflict line and
benefit from the high availability of voters (Table 3). Note
that vote-seeking considerations imply the instrumental
use of both national and EU (polity and policy) issues, de-
pending on what ‘sells’ best within the respective elec-
torate at a given point in time (see also Heinkelmann-
Wild, Kriegmair, & Rittberger, 2020). Greater clarity of
positions among vote-seekers is expected on the polity
dimension (pro-/anti-EU) and on those specific EU policy
issues fromwhich parties can gain electorally in the given
(domestic) context. To incentivize parties to campaign on
transnational rather than national issues, Europe’s voting
space should be (even if only partially) transnationalized
(Bright, Garzia, Lacey, & Trechsel, 2016).
5. Conclusion: How the Rules of the Game Help
Nationalists Gain
The ‘second-order national election theory’ of EP
elections centers on turnout and government party
losses (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, Sanz, Braun, &
Teperoglou, 2020). The focus of this and related theo-
rizing (for a discussion, see Marsh, 2009) is on voting
behavior, while the locus of explanation for EP election
results lies in the national arena (electoral cycle/rules,
etc.). In this narrative, European elections are likely to
cease being dominated by national issues once European
issues penetrate the national arena, which is what has
happened during multiple crises. Here I focus on party
behavior and locate the explanation in the European
arena itself. Since parties embody the link between the
citizenry and EU institutions, party behavior is partic-
ularly important for understanding the relationship of
European citizens and the EU polity, as well as the rise
of Euroscepticism across Europe.
The argument I develop concerns barriers to the
supply and demand of political competition and the
ways in which the institutional setup of the European
election undermines ‘transnational policy’ competition.
Conceptualizing the EP arena as a political-electoral mar-
ket (Bartolini, 1999, 2000) and examining the dimensions
of competition in the EP arena in relation to one an-
other sheds light on structural obstacles to political inte-
gration. Specifying the empirical conditions under which
parties compete in this arena, using Bartolini’s (1999,
2000) framework, reveals the consequences of vote-,
policy-, and office-seeking behavior under the particular
conditions of this arena.
How vote-, policy-, and office-seeking parties engage
with the EP electoral arena has implications for decidabil-
ity, understood here as the ‘levels of actual choice’ of-
fered to European voters. Although the European arena
is not appealing to office-seekers, it enables easier entry
for willing vote- and policy-seeking outsiders, as long as
these are national (as opposed to transnational) organi-
zations. When political opposition cannot be expressed
in transnational policy termswithin the system, however,
then it inevitably directs itself at the polity and the politi-
cal personnel, which is exactly what nationalist and pop-
ulist parties seeking votes have been doing, and which,
in the absence of structural reform, they will keep on do-
ing with success (Mair, 2007). If Europeans’ opposition
to EU policies cannot be of a transnationalist nature un-
der the current structure, then such opposition is likely
to be nationalist. In other words, the system inhibits
the transnational expression of opposition to EU policies
(which, however, is key for Europeans’ capacity to influ-
ence supranational policy direction and for Europe’s po-
litical integration). Since the rise of nationalist populist
Euroscepticism is evidently detrimental to the European
project, convinced Europeanists might want to consider
changing the current incentive structures. Any future re-
form, however, needs to take into account not just one
but all dimensions of electoral competition and the con-
sequences each dimension entails for the others.
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